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BEYOND A POLITICS OF THE POSSIBLE? 
SOUTH–NORTH RELATIONS AND CLIMATE JUSTICE 
Beyond a Politics of the Possible? 
KARIN MICKELSON* 
This symposium’s issue on ‘Climate Justice and International Environmental Law: Rethinking 
the North–South Divide’ asks contributors ‘to explore the intersection between law and emerging 
ideas of climate justice, and how international environmental law is shaped by and in turn 
reshapes (or fixates, or interrogates) our understandings of the North–South divide’. In relation 
to the former, I posit that there appears to be a profound disconnect between the law and the 
politics of climate change, one that reflects a broader disconnect between those who view the 
challenge posed by climate change through an ethical lens, and those who see it in pragmatic 
terms. In relation to the latter, I consider the various arguments as to why we need to rethink 
North–South relations, and explain why many of those arguments need to be critically evaluated 
in terms of their embedded assumptions. I conclude by arguing that climate change requires us to 
move beyond a ‘politics of the possible’ to a ‘politics of the improbable’. 
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Politics is the art of the possible. 
Otto von Bismarck1 
Politics is not the art of the possible. It consists in choosing between the 
disastrous and the unpalatable. 
J K Galbraith2 
I INTRODUCTION 
The Editors have posed a challenging set of questions to be addressed in this 
symposium issue on ‘Climate Justice and International Environmental Law: 
Rethinking the North–South Divide’. As I have pondered these questions, I have 
joined thousands of others throughout the world who are doing much the same 
thing this year. The year 2009 has become critically important in the minds of 
those who follow the climate change negotiations, with the deadline for 
achieving a post-Kyoto consensus looming at the upcoming Copenhagen Climate 
Change Conference in December. On the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (‘UNFCCC’) website, a ‘Countdown to Copenhagen’ 
appears in a prominent position, with the days, hours, minutes and seconds all 
                                                 
 * Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. The author would like to thank the 
Editorial Committee of the Melbourne Journal of International Law for their assistance, and 
the two anonymous reviewers of this piece for their thoughtful comments. 
 1 ‘Remark to Meyer von Waldeck, 11 August 1867’ in Fred R Shapiro (ed), The Yale Book of 
Quotations (2006) 86. 
 2 ‘Letter from J K Galbraith to John F Kennedy, 2 March 1962’ in J K Galbraith, 
Ambassador’s Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years (1969). 
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ticking away. When I first saw it, I could not help thinking of the famous 
‘Doomsday Clock’,3 which has long been used to illustrate how close we are to 
catastrophic destruction. The analogy was heightened when I learned that the 
organisation that maintains the ‘Doomsday Clock’, now monitors 
climate-changing technologies as one of the means by which humanity could 
obliterate itself.4 
As awareness of the potentially calamitous impacts of climate change has 
grown and spread, the recognition of how profoundly those impacts will affect 
the most vulnerable and marginalised has also increased. While an understanding 
of the ethical dimensions of climate change is by no means a recent 
phenomenon,5 notions of ‘climate justice’ are gaining increasing visibility in the 
current discourse regarding climate change. In 2002, representatives from a wide 
range of social and environmental justice organisations met in Bali to proclaim 
the ‘Bali Principles of Climate Justice’, in which they resolved ‘to begin to build 
an international movement of all peoples for Climate Justice’.6 Since then, civil 
society groups and movements from all over the world have taken up that 
challenge with enormous dedication and enthusiasm.7 From Durban8 to 
Bangkok,9 Brussels10 to Belem,11 meetings on climate justice have been held on 
every continent. The resulting declarations and documents have always insisted 
                                                 
 3 See, eg, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Doomsday Clock Overview (2009) 
<http://www.thebulletin.org/content/doomsday-clock/overview>. 
 4 Ibid. 
 5 There is a long-standing body of scholarly literature on the ethics of climate change. For an 
early example, see Henry Shue, ‘The Unavoidability of Justice’ in Andrew Hurrell and 
Benedict Kingsbury (eds), The International Politics of the Environment: Actors, Interests 
and Institutions (1992) 373. In recent years, a substantial body of writing has begun to 
develop on more specific topics, such as different approaches to assigning and quantifying 
responsibility for climate change (for example, equal per capita entitlements or historical 
responsibility for current greenhouse gas concentrations). For a useful and relatively recent 
survey of the various ethical aspects of climate change, see Donald Brown et al, White 
Paper on the Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change (White Paper, Rock Ethics Institute, 
Penn State University, 2006). For an online bibliographic compilation on ethics and climate 
change, see Rock Ethics Institute, Bibliography (2006) <http://rockethics.psu.edu/ 
climate/education/bibliography.shtml>. 
 6 International Climate Justice Network, ‘Bali Principles of Climate Justice’ (Paper presented 
at the United Nations World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, South 
Africa, 29 August 2002) <http://www.ejnet.org/ej/bali.pdf>.  
 7 For a useful overview of the climate justice movement, see J Timmons Roberts, 
‘Globalizing Environmental Justice’ in Ronald Sandler and Phaedra C Pezzullo (eds), 
Environmental Justice and Environmentalism: The Social Justice Challenge to the 
Environmental Movement (2007) 285, 293. 
 8 Durban Group for Climate Justice, Durban Declaration on Carbon Trading (Durban, South 
Africa, 10 October 2004) <http://www.carbontradewatch.org/durban/statementeng.pdf>. 
 9 A Climate Justice Conference was held in Bangkok, Thailand from 12–14 July 2008. For 
the corresponding conference report, see Towards Climate Justice in Asia (Climate Justice 
Conference Summary Report, 12–14 July 2008) <http://www.ecologicaldebt.org/ 
documentos/noticias/thailand_climate_justice_conference_summary.doc>. 
 10 A conference on ‘Global Contract Based on Climate Justice — The Need for a New 
Approach concerning International Relations’ was held in the European  
Parliament in Brussels on 11 November 2008. It was organised by the Ecosocial  
Forum Europe in cooperation with the Potsdam Institute for Climate  
Impact Research. For the related conference summary and presentations, see Global 
Contract, Conference Summary and Presentations (2008) <http://www.global-contract.eu/ 
Conference_Summary_and_presentations_index-23.html>. 
 11 World Social Forum, Climate Justice Assembly Declaration (Belem, Brazil, 4 February 
2009) <http://www.tni.org/detail_page.phtml?act_id=19174>. 
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upon the need to foreground equity in the climate change negotiations, and often 
called for a fundamental shift in our political and economic systems and 
thinking. Furthermore, governments have also invoked the language of climate 
justice. For example, speaking at a ‘Technical Briefing on Historical 
Responsibility as a Guide to Future Action to Address Climate Change’, on 
4 June 2009,12 Bolivian Ambassador Angelica Navarro emphasised her state’s 
particular vulnerability to climate change, before going on to deliver an 
impassioned plea that historical responsibility must be seen as the basis for an 
enormous and unpaid ‘carbon debt’ that is part of a broader ecological debt owed 
by developed countries to developing countries. Writing in 2006, Saleemul Huq 
and Camilla Toumlin of the International Institute for Environment and 
Development argued that there have been three eras of climate change, and that 
the third and most recent has concern for justice at its core: 
A shift is happening in the way climate change is perceived, from just an 
environmental issue, or even an environment and development issue, to one of 
global justice, or more correctly, global injustice. One group of people (namely 
people everywhere, but mostly in rich countries) have caused the problem, and 
another group of people (namely poor people especially in poor countries) will 
suffer most of the adverse consequences, in the near term.13 
It is in light of this growing awareness that climate change is, at its core, a 
problem of global injustice — coupled with a sense of urgency (if not, of 
impending doom) regarding the need for a meaningful response to the  
problem — that I propose to address the two questions posed by the Editors. 
They have asked us, first, ‘to explore the intersection between law and emerging 
ideas of climate justice’; in so doing, I consider whether we have, in fact, moved 
into a new era of climate change in which justice is perceived as fundamental. 
Second, they have asked us to explore ‘how international environmental law is 
shaped by and in turn reshapes (or fixates, or interrogates) our understandings of 
the North–South divide’. In response, I grapple with the question of whether it 
might be time to rethink the North–South divide, as we are (at least implicitly) 
invited to do in this symposium. 
II A NEW ERA OF CLIMATE CHANGE? 
International environmental law has always reflected an understanding that 
the concept of justice is fundamental to addressing climate change, albeit one 
that may not dovetail exactly with the understanding of justice articulated by 
Huq and Toumlin.14 A major focal point for concerns about justice has been the 
principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’. The principle did not 
originate in the context of climate change, but it is here that it has achieved its 
                                                 
 12 Angelica Navarro, ‘Climate Debt: The Basis of a Fair and Effective Solution for Climate 
Change’ (Paper presented at the ‘Technical Briefing on Historical Responsibility as a Guide 
to Future Action to Address Climate Change’, Bonn, Germany, 4 June 2009). The Technical 
Briefing was convened as a special session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term 
Cooperative Action. 
 13 Saleemul Huq and Camilla Toumlin, Sustainable Development Opinion: Three Eras of 
Climate Change (International Institute for Environment and Development, Sustainable 
Development Opinion, 2006) <http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/11060IIED.pdf>. 
 14 Ibid.  
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best-known (and most controversial) formulation. It is reflected in the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,15 in strikingly clear terms:  
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future 
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. 
Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating 
climate change and the adverse effects thereof.16  
The Kyoto Protocol17 notably (or notoriously, depending on one’s point of 
view) imposes binding emissions reduction commitments only on developed (or 
‘Annex I’) countries. Even the Bali Action Plan,18 the negotiating platform 
agreed to at the UN Climate Change Conference held in 2007 — while 
representing a fundamental breakthrough where developing countries agreed to 
discuss possible mitigation actions under a post-Kyoto regime — continues to 
reflect the same concerns. Calling for a ‘shared vision for long-term cooperative 
action’ in order to achieve the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC, the Bali 
Action Plan nonetheless insists that such action must be in accordance with the 
Convention itself, ‘in particular the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities’.19 The reference in the Bali Action 
Plan to ‘nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties’ 
is doubly qualified by specifying that these must be ‘in the context of sustainable 
development’ as well as ‘supported and enabled by technology, financing and 
capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner’.20 
Climate change law has been less successful at articulating the broader 
concerns that are reflected in the concept of climate justice. Let us leave aside for 
the moment the fundamental question of the extent to which climate change is 
entwined with current economic and political systems. In general, the climate 
change regime has addressed the differences in vulnerability to climate change 
through a focus on support for adaptation, which has received increased attention 
in recent years. Scholars have identified various explanations as to why 
adaptation to climate change received little attention from either a legal or a 
scientific perspective in the early years of the climate change regime.21 Among 
the most prominent is that a discussion of adaptation was seen as defeatist and 
unproductive, since it assumed that mitigation efforts would be insufficient to 
address anthropogenic climate change, and the view that adaptation raised the 
question of who should ‘foot the bill’, which was objectionable to developed 
                                                 
 15 Opened for signature 4 June 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (entered into force 21 March 1994) 
(‘UNFCCC’). 
 16 Ibid art 3(1).  
 17 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened 
for signature 16 March 1998, 2303 UNTS 148 (entered into force 16 February 2005) 
(‘Kyoto Protocol’). 
 18 Conference of the Parties (‘COP’), UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its 
Thirteenth Session, Held in Bali from 3 to 15 December 2007, Addendum — Part Two: 
Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its Thirteenth Session, 13th sess, UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (14 March 2008) 3 (Decision 1/CP.13 — Bali Action Plan) (‘Bali 
Action Plan’). 
 19 Ibid. 
 20 Ibid. 
 21 E Lisa F Schipper, ‘Conceptual History of Adaptation in the UNFCCC Process’ (2006) 15 
Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 82. 
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countries.22 In any event, it soon became clear that dealing with adaptation was a 
necessity. This political consensus was reflected in the establishment of the 
Adaptation Fund as part of the 2001 Marrakesh Accords.23 More recently, the 
Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action, set up pursuant to 
the Bali Action Plan, was called upon to consider ‘enhanced action on 
adaptation’ as an integral part of its mandate. There is no doubt that vulnerability 
to climate change tends to be understood in terms of differences between states, 
rather than within states, which fails to capture the full spectrum of climate 
justice concerns. Nevertheless, at least some of those concerns are reflected in 
the existing legal framework. 
Climate change politics, on the other hand, has reflected a more deeply 
contested understanding of what justice requires. From the earliest days of 
international political deliberation and debate on the issue, there has been 
resistance to seeing the climate change regime as being, in part, about sustainable 
development and international equity, and criticism of its exclusion of binding 
commitments for developing country parties. For example, one commentator 
characterised the UNFCCC as ‘the absolute lowest common denominator 
outcome’, not because of its lack of binding obligations for the North, but 
because of ‘the South’s unwillingness to accept any responsibility for mitigating 
[the] adverse effects of the build-up of greenhouse gases caused by development 
in the North, unless the North [was] willing to increase substantially the 
development assistance given to the South’.24 In that author’s view, this attitude, 
coupled with the North’s unwillingness to foot the bill, led to a weak and 
‘inconsequential’ Convention. The discussion of developing country 
commitments continued during the process leading up to the first Conference of 
the Parties (‘COP-1’) in April 1995. That meeting adopted the Berlin Mandate,25 
launching a new round of negotiations that was to result in the Kyoto Protocol, 
based on the recognition that commitments for developed country parties were 
inadequate. Developing country commitments were specifically excluded. 
Nevertheless, the debate about the leadership and obligations of developed 
countries persisted, reflected most notably when then United States President 
George W Bush indicated that the US would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol due, 
in part, to the perceived ‘unfairness’ of excluding large developing country 
emitters from obligations. The breakthrough in Bali regarding a willingness to 
discuss some form of mitigation action for developing countries has, if anything, 
intensified the debate, rather than laid it to rest. 
                                                 
 22 Ibid 84. 
 23 The Marrakesh Accords are the decisions adopted by the seventh session of the COP: COP, 
UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventh Session, Held at 
Marrakesh from 29 October to 10 November 2001, 7th sess, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2001/13 (21 
January 2002) (‘Marrakesh Accords’). 
 24 Lawrence E Susskind, ‘What Will It Take to Ensure Effective Global Environmental 
Management? A Reassessment of Regime-Building Accomplishments’ in Bertram I 
Spector, Gunnar Sjöstedt and I William Zartman (eds), Negotiating International Regimes: 
Lessons Learned from the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) (1994) 221, 224. 
 25 Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate, UNFCCC, Implementation of the Berlin Mandate: 
Proposals from Parties, UN Doc FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.1/ADD.8 (1997) 8 (‘Berlin 
Mandate’). 
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A New York Times editorial, published on 16 June 2009, can be said to 
exemplify many aspects of the prevailing attitude.26 Entitled ‘Climate Trap’, it 
begins by discussing attempts on the part of various members of the Obama 
Administration and other US Government officials to engage China in 
discussions about climate change. The editorial reports that the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, who had visited China in May 2009 
accompanied by other Congressional leaders, ‘found herself greatly encouraged 
by the dialogue but deeply afraid that the two countries would fall into an old 
trap: hiding behind each other so that neither would have to do anything difficult 
or expensive’.27 The editorial goes on to characterise this comment as a 
‘legitimate fear’, noting that the US has resisted accepting binding emissions 
reduction commitments unless developing countries like China take on similar 
commitments, while China has insisted that the developed countries (namely the 
US), ‘move first and do more’ because of their historical contributions to 
greenhouse gas concentrations.28 
Perhaps attempting to present a balanced view, the editorial seems to equate 
the US and China and their respective positions. It notes that the US tops the list 
of per capita emitters of greenhouse gases, while characterising China as the 
‘biggest overall emitter’.29 It mentions that steps have already been taken by 
each country in relation to climate change. However, the gaps in the editorial’s 
analysis are striking. The issue of historical contributions to greenhouse gas 
concentrations is mentioned only in the context of discussing how the Chinese 
justify their stance. There is no indication that this could be a legitimate concern. 
More significantly, the editorial makes no mention of the continued significant 
disparity in per capita emissions, the size of the Chinese population relative to its 
overall emissions, or what percentage of those emissions originates from its 
export-oriented industrial sector, much of which is driven by US consumer 
demand. There is no reference to the applicable legal framework at all, let alone 
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, or anything hinting at 
its importance in the climate change regime. More surprisingly, the editorial does 
not reflect an accurate understanding of the current state of negotiations and 
discussions in relation to emissions limitations in developing countries. It 
criticises the Chinese Government’s position for assuming that emissions will 
continue to rise, when in fact many observers take the view that, at least in the 
short term, China should be limiting emissions growth rather than pursuing 
absolute emissions reduction. 
What is heartening about the editorial is that it proposes that the US forge 
ahead on climate change initiatives, even in the absence of corresponding 
Chinese commitments, asserting that setting a positive example is the best option 
to encourage China to move forward as well. It concludes by acknowledging that 
‘[t]his may not be enough to get the Chinese to do what’s necessary, but it will 
take away an important excuse’.30 However, characterising the Chinese position 
as an excuse trivialises it and the ideas of fairness that might be said to underlie 
                                                 
 26 Editorial, ‘Climate Trap’, New York Times (New York, US), 16 June 2009, A20. 
 27 Ibid. 
 28 Ibid. 
 29 Ibid. 
 30 Ibid. 
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it. In fact, the notion of justice is missing from this analysis altogether. While 
many would appreciate and share the concern that action need be taken, it is 
disturbing that this is seen as somehow entirely disconnected from the legal 
context in which climate change negotiations are taking place. 
The attitude reflected in this editorial is far from unique. Sadly, in fact, it 
should be considered an enlightened one given its insistence on US action, even 
in the face of Chinese inaction. In my view, this points to a disconnect between 
the law and politics of climate change that in turn reflects a broader disconnect 
between those who view the challenge posed by climate change through an 
ethical lens, and those who see it in pragmatic terms. 
For the ‘ethicists’ (if I may be permitted to use this term for the countless 
activists and scholars who work on issues of climate justice), the ethical 
dimensions of climate change are fundamental to understanding all aspects of the 
problem: causes, effects and possible solutions. Whether they champion an 
approach to responsibility for climate change that is based on historical 
contributions or present day inequalities, what is central is the view that 
responsibility and ethics are inextricably connected to one another.  
The ‘pragmatists’, on the other hand, seem to feel that ethical considerations 
have to be downplayed in order to achieve political consensus. Consider the 
following candid response of Christopher Flavin, President of the Worldwatch 
Institute, an important US-based non-governmental organisation, when asked 
early in 2009 about the possibility of carbon emissions being allocated on a 
per capita basis: 
I think that, from an idealistic point of view, that is a wonderful strategy. I think a 
moral philosopher would have a very hard time disagreeing with it. I think it is, 
frankly, a nonstarter politically. The world is not going to agree to the kind of 
large-scale redistribution of income that that would require. I think that what we 
need is certainly some redistribution of income as part of this process — I would 
not argue against that — but I think, inevitably, it is going to take a hundred 
years, at minimum, to actually get to the sort of level playing field in terms of 
carbon emissions. Countries start at very, very different levels today. There are a 
lot of accidents of history. Countries have a lot of emissions — for example, 
China — because they happen to have a lot of coal. There are a lot of poor 
African countries that just don’t happen to have a lot of fossil fuels, so they have 
not developed it in part for that reason. I think that addressing it as a purely equity 
issue is not going to get to that win/win economic opportunity framework, which 
I think, frankly, is the only way we are going to politically move forward.31 
I have reproduced the entire answer here because it is so revealing. It clearly 
assumes a dichotomy between ethics and realism. Almost as significant, 
however, are the other assumptions implicit in Flavin’s answer. When Flavin 
states that ‘[t]he world is not going to agree to … large-scale redistribution of 
income’, he really seems to mean that the wealthy will not give up their position 
of privilege. When he talks about ‘accidents of history’, he focuses on the 
distribution of carbon-based resources, rather than the fact of patterns of unequal 
and inequitable development. I do not mean to single Flavin out for criticism; 
                                                 
 31 Christopher Flavin, ‘Fordham Environmental Law Review Fifteenth Annual Symposium, 
Energy and Climate Change: North and South Perspectives: Keynote Address’ (2009) 19 
Fordham Environmental Law Review 231, 247–8. 
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elsewhere in his presentation he does, in fact, argue in favour of an approach that 
combines a moral understanding with a focus on economic opportunities.32 
Nevertheless, when a high profile ‘Northern’ environmentalist feels the need to 
assert that a ‘win/win economic opportunity framework … is the only way we 
are going to politically move forward’, it becomes apparent just how profound 
the disconnect between ethics and pragmatism really is. And this disconnect 
makes it difficult to accept that we have entered into a new era of climate 
change. 
III A NEW ERA OF SOUTH–NORTH RELATIONS? 
If there is reason to doubt that we have entered into a new era of climate 
change, it is still possible that we have entered into a new era of South–North 
relations, or that it might be time to rethink the North–South divide. When one 
considers why this might be the case, a number of possible reasons come to 
mind, and although none is particularly new, each illuminates a dimension that 
needs to be taken into account in assessing the current state of international 
affairs in relation to climate change. 
One is almost purely pragmatic. While there have always been problems with 
seeing the global South as some kind of monolith, it is certainly possible to argue 
that it no longer makes any sense to speak of ‘the South’ when countries like 
China, India and Brazil appear to be in a completely different category and 
therefore need to be treated in a different way.33 This is certainly reflected in 
current demands that larger developing countries accept commitments under the 
post-Kyoto climate change regime, and in the EU view that ‘[d]iffering national 
circumstances and stages of development in developing countries require 
differentiated actions and … levels of ambition’.34 Beyond the confines of the 
climate change regime, it could be argued that the new political landscape is 
reflected in new state coalitions, such as ‘BRIC’ (Brazil, Russia, India, China). 
While the acronym was first coined by an economist to refer to the fastest 
developing non-OECD nations, it has come to take on greater significance, as the 
four states themselves have begun to engage in collective dialogue that crosses 
traditional North–South lines.35 
Second, the use of categories such as ‘North’ and ‘South’ arguably obscures 
the extent to which there is a ‘North’ in the ‘South’ and a ‘South’ in the ‘North’. 
In the climate change context, this makes it more difficult to focus on the 
                                                 
 32 Ibid 245, 247–8. 
 33 Of course, there are also differences between countries in ‘the North’ that need to be taken 
into account. The distinctive treatment accorded to countries with economies ‘in transition’ 
is only one example. 
 34 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions: Towards a Comprehensive Climate Change Agreement in 
Copenhagen, Doc No COM(2009) 39 final (Brussels, Belgium, 28 January 2009) [3.2] 
<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/future_action/communication.pdf>. 
 35 Note, for example, the heads of state of the BRIC countries held their first official summit in 
June 2009, during which they ‘discussed the current situation in global economy and other 
pressing issues of global development, and also prospects for further strengthening 
collaboration within the BRIC’: see BRIC, Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries’ Leaders 
(Statement, First BRIC Summit, Yekaterinburg, Russia, 16 June 2009) 
<http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2009/06/217963.shtml>. 
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fundamental ethical concerns of responsibility for and vulnerability to climate 
change. This is reflected in Huq and Toumlin’s view that those responsible for 
the problem are ‘rich people everywhere, but mostly in rich countries’, yet those 
who will bear the brunt of its effects will be ‘poor people especially in poor 
countries’.36 In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in particular, it is impossible 
to assert that vulnerability to climate change can be neatly divided along 
geographical lines. Instead, understanding vulnerability requires attention to 
race, class and gender, which is consistent with well-established understandings 
of environmental justice. Among those most vulnerable to climate change are 
indigenous peoples in the far North, whose way of life is threatened. In fact, 
indigenous peoples worldwide are likely to experience the effects of climate 
change in a particularly devastating fashion. As the participants at the Indigenous 
Peoples Global Summit on Climate Change, held in April 2009, pointed out: 
We are experiencing profound and disproportionate adverse impacts on our 
cultures, human and environmental health, human rights, well-being, traditional 
livelihoods, food systems and food sovereignty, local infrastructure, economic 
viability, and our very survival as Indigenous Peoples.37 
Even more damning is the argument that ‘North–South’ not only serves to 
blur differences within states, but is wilfully deployed to conceal those 
differences. Walden Bello, a well-known anti-globalisation activist, has insisted 
that ‘[i]t is the national elites that spout the ultra-Third Worldist line that the 
South has yet to fulfill its quota of polluting the world while the North has 
exceeded its quota’.38 He sees evidence of a commonality of interest on the part 
of elites worldwide:  
When the Bush administration refuses to ratify the Kyoto Protocol because it does 
not bind China and India, and the Chinese and Indian governments say they will 
not tolerate curbs on their greenhouse gas emissions because the United States has 
not ratified Kyoto, they are in fact playing out an unholy alliance to allow their 
economic elites to continue to evade their environmental responsibilities and 
free-ride on the rest of the world.39 
And finally, it may no longer make sense to talk about ‘North’ and ‘South’ 
because climate change poses a challenge on an unprecedented scale. Leaving 
aside the issue of vulnerability, climate change is a global problem that requires 
global solutions. From this perspective, we are all in this together and focusing 
on a divide between ‘North’ and ‘South’ is counterproductive because we need 
to focus on what unites us rather than what divides us. Even worse, it might 
actually stymie progress because it creates a false sense that some will be able to 
insulate themselves from the effects of climate change, when those effects may 
well be so widespread and far-reaching that no one will be left untouched. 
Predictions of widespread population movements, so-called ‘climate change 
                                                 
 36 Huq and Toumlin, above n 13. 
 37 Indigenous Peoples Global Summit on Climate Change, The Anchorage Declaration 
(Anchorage, US, 24 April 2009) <http://www.indigenoussummit.com/servlet/content/ 
declaration.html>. 
 38 Walden Bello, ‘Elites vs Greens in the Global South’ (Fall 2008) 47 Synthesis/Regeneration 
26. 
 39 Ibid. 
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refugees’, underscore the pointlessness of viewing climate change as a problem 
that will affect ‘them’ rather than ‘us’. 
Each of these factors is compelling. Together, they seem to pose an 
insurmountable challenge to the idea of a North–South divide in relation to 
climate change. Yet, none is without flaws. While it is true that there is 
enormous diversity among so-called developing countries, the idea of the global 
South, like that of the Third World before it, has never been about homogeneity 
or uniformity. China and India have each experienced significant levels of 
growth over the last few decades, but even forty years ago, during the height of 
‘Third Worldism’, would it have made sense to equate China with Cambodia, or 
India with Nepal?40 In fact, the disparities between the countries of the South go 
back to the earliest days of Third World dialogue. In his opening speech at the 
1955 Bandung Conference, for example, President Soekarno of Indonesia 
emphasised the ‘spirit of diversity’ existing among the participants. He further 
noted the presence of nations of differing size, religion, and economic and 
political approach, and pointing out that the gathering sought  
to impress on the world that it is possible to live together, meet together, speak to 
each other without losing one’s individual identity; and yet to contribute to the 
general understanding of matters of common concern and to develop a true 
consciousness of the interdependence of men and nations for their well-being and 
survival on earth.41 
Similarly, the awareness of disparities within the countries of the South is not 
new. In the 1960s and 1970s, dependency theory and world systems theory 
emphasised the distinction between the ‘core’ (capital-intensive nations) and the 
‘periphery’ (labour- and/or resource-intensive nations), but also understood that 
there was a ‘core of the periphery’ and a ‘periphery of the core’.42 There is no 
doubt that some in the ‘South’ may have the resources to protect themselves 
from at least some of the effects of climate change, while many in the ‘North’ 
might be unable to do so. The fact remains, however, that a map of global 
vulnerability to climate change still reveals a significant North–South divide. It is 
essential to keep in mind that ‘vulnerability’ to climate change is not the same as 
‘susceptibility’ to climate change. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (‘IPCC’):  
Vulnerability is the degree to which a system is susceptible to, and unable to cope 
with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and 
extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate of 
climate change and variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its 
adaptive capacity.43  
                                                 
 40 Cambodia and Nepal fall into the category of ‘Least Developed Countries’ in the UN 
system. See, eg, United Nations Statistics Division, Composition of Macro Geographical 
(Continental) Regions, Geographical Sub-Regions, and Selected Economic and Other 
Groupings <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#ftnc>. 
 41 President Soekarno, Indonesia, ‘Opening Keynote Address at the Asian–African 
Conference’ (Speech delivered at the Asian–African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, 18–
24 April 1955). 
 42 See generally Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction (2004). 
 43 IPCC, ‘Summary for Policymakers’ in Working Group II, IPCC, Climate Change 2007: 
Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability (IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, 2007) 7, 21. 
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In addition to the far ‘North’, the regions that are among the most susceptible 
to climate change are low-lying coastal areas, small islands, and areas already 
experiencing water scarcity. Countries with these characteristics are, 
overwhelmingly, located in the global ‘South’, and frequently lack the 
infrastructure and resources to adequately respond to the challenges posed. 
While it is true that elites within those highly-vulnerable countries might be able 
to insulate themselves from some of the likely impacts, it is worth asking how far 
that ability would extend if those impacts turn out to be as devastating as many 
have predicted. 
This last point links to the argument that ‘North–South’ is deployed to 
conceal differences within states. With the greatest respect to Bello, it is simply 
not accurate to state that only Southern elites espouse the view that ‘the South 
has yet to fulfil its quota of polluting the world while the North has exceeded its 
quota’.44 Southern-based civil society organisations such as the Third World 
Network and Centre for Science and Environment have championed variations of 
this view.45 The global climate justice movement, from church-based 
organisations to environmental justice organisations, sees the acknowledgment 
of differentiated obligations as crucial to an equitable outcome of the current 
round of negotiations. And it is invoked by governmental representatives from 
all regions and backgrounds, in any number of different settings, at least some of 
whom have impeccable representative credentials. 
Regardless of the relative merit of arguments that can be made in relation to 
whether it might be time to rethink the North–South divide, a fundamental 
question remains: should we do so? The preceding discussion has shown that we 
must recognise the limitations of our categories. There are significant differences 
in perspective and interest among the various Southern states, which the debates 
about climate change have revealed with crystal clarity. One need only consider 
the chasm between the small-island states, represented in the Alliance of Small 
Island States (‘AOSIS’), whose calls for drastic action have repeatedly fallen on 
deaf ears, and the petroleum-exporting states, who have insisted that the interests 
of states ‘with economies that are vulnerable to the adverse effects of the 
implementation of measures to respond to climate change’46 be taken into 
account. Furthermore, the idea of common but differentiated obligations does not 
necessarily entail complete uniformity of treatment among countries with widely 
differing circumstances, and thus a lack of differentiation among the countries of 
the ‘South’. China, for example, has indicated that nationally-appropriate 
mitigation actions should take into account each developing country’s 
‘respective capacities and specific national circumstances’.47 Scholars and 
activists have attempted to fashion approaches to allocating emissions 
                                                 
 44 Cf Bello, above n 38. 
 45 See, eg, Martin Khor, Third World Network, ‘Development Issues Crucial for Post-2012 
Climate Regime’ (Briefing Paper No 1, UN Climate Change Conference, Bali, Indonesia,  
3–14 December 2007) <http://www.twnside.org.sg/climate.briefings.htm>; Centre for 
Science and Environment, ‘CSE Charts an Agenda for Action in Poznan, Calls for Tough 
Action to Reduce Emissions and an Agreement Based on Equity’ (Press Release, 4 
December 2008) <http://www.cseindia.org/AboutUs/press_releases/press_20081204.htm>. 
 46 UNFCCC, above n 15, art 4(10).  
 47 China’s Views on the Fulfillment of the Bali Action Plan and the Components of the Agreed 
Outcome to be Adopted by the Conference of the Parties at Its 15th Session (Submission, 6 
February 2009) 2 <http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/china060209.pdf>. 
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entitlements that reflect more nuanced distinctions between nations that take into 
account actual consumption levels.48 
It is all too easy to dismiss the idea of the ‘global South’ as opportunistic 
posturing or naïve pleading. At worst, it appears to be an artificial coalition in 
which the larger developing countries hide behind the smaller, and differences 
are denied or swept under the carpet. At best, it could be seen as a quaint 
invocation of platitudes about solidarity and shared aspirations. Yet these types 
of criticisms have been raised against any and every attempts by developing 
countries to capitalise on the strength in numbers that has tended to be a poor 
substitute for real economic clout and political leverage. For, in the end, what 
may be most remarkable about the idea of the South is its staying power. The 
idea that developing countries are united by more than what divides them has a 
resonance that somehow transcends the passage of time as well as changes in 
circumstance and nomenclature. 
Another possibility comes to mind. It is that ‘rethinking’ does not necessarily 
mean rejecting or abandoning. Perhaps it is time to rethink the ‘North–South’ 
divide by re-embracing it, because we now recognise that long-standing demands 
for global justice are no longer abstract or theoretical. Rather, they are concrete, 
real and quantifiable. We cannot ignore either historical disparities in 
contributions to greenhouse gas concentrations or present day inequalities in 
per capita emissions. Both result in unequal contributions to a problem, the 
effects of which will be felt throughout the international community, and are 
likely to have particularly tragic consequences among the world’s most 
vulnerable and marginalised populations. A genuine engagement with inequality 
with regard to both responsibility and vulnerability might lead to a different way 
of approaching climate change. However, this would require a fundamental 
change in approach. 
IV A NEW KIND OF CLIMATE CHANGE POLITICS 
To a very large extent, climate change politics over the last 20 years seems to 
have been all about the politics of the possible, what is acceptable within the 
parameters of mainstream political, economic and social thinking. Looming 
above this bureaucratic logjam, however, are the truly frightening implications of 
climate change for all life on this planet. Galbraith’s statement quoted above 
seems to encapsulate our current dilemma. Governments (as well as industry and 
individuals) have resisted the unpalatable prospect of re-evaluating many of our 
assumptions at a fundamental level. On the other hand, the disastrous 
implications of maintaining the status quo are invoked with increasing frequency 
and urgency. The ramifications are increasingly difficult to ignore. 
                                                 
 48 See, eg, Paul Baer et al, ‘Greenhouse Development Rights: Towards an Equitable 
Framework for Global Climate Policy’ (2008) 21 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 
649, 649. The authors note that: 
By taking into account the distribution of income and emissions within countries, and 
calculating national obligations as if they were the aggregated obligations of 
individuals, the framework treats every global citizen identically, and allocates 
obligations even to poor countries that are proportional to their actual middle-class 
and wealthy populations. 
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Somehow, then, we need to move beyond a politics of the possible. Some 
might argue in favour of a pragmatic ‘politics of the unpalatable’, which is an 
acknowledgment that we need to shift away from ‘business as usual’ in order to 
meet the challenge posed by climate change. Others might boldly embrace 
Bataille’s ‘politics of the impossible’, a subversion of all accepted wisdom, 
which some may see reflected in the global justice movement worldwide and its 
demands for radical reform.49 What may be required, however, is a politics of the 
improbable — more demanding than the first option, more modest than the 
second. And it is here that notions of climate justice will have to play a central 
role. The pragmatists’ assumption that we need a ‘win/win economic opportunity 
framework’ may be setting our sights too low. After all, appeals to enlightened 
self-interest seem to have met with limited success to date. It may be time to call 
for an ethic of responsibility instead. 
A politics of the improbable would be based on the recognition that what we 
are facing requires a leap of faith, an acknowledgement of how far beyond our 
comfort zones we are. It would be based, above all, on a sense of hope, that 
Homo sapiens as a species, that we as a collective, no matter how unlikely it may 
seem, will be able to meet the challenge before us and change course before it is 
too late. 
 
                                                 
 49 See Jean-Michel Besnier, ‘Georges Bataille in the 1930s: A Politics of the Impossible’ 
(1990) 78 Yale French Studies 169 (Amy Reid trans). 
